From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of Medicaid managed care (MMC) increased from 11 percent to 71 percent. This increase was largely driven by state and local mandates that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an MMC plan. Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether the shift from fee-for-service into managed care would lead to an increase or a reduction in Medicaid spending. This paper investigates this effect using a data set on state and local-level MMC mandates and detailed data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on state Medicaid expenditures. The findings suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into MMC did not on average reduce Medicaid spending. If anything, our results suggest that the shift to MMC increased Medicaid spending and that this effect was especially present for risk-based HMOs. However, the effects of the shift to MMC on Medicaid spending varied significantly across states as a function of the generosity of the state's baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates. 1 Abstract From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of Medicaid managed care (MMC) increased from 11 percent to 71 percent. This increase was largely driven by state and local mandates that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an MMC plan. Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether the shift from fee-for-service into managed care would lead to an increase or a reduction in Medicaid spending. This paper investigates this effect using a data set on state and local level MMC mandates and detailed data from CMS on state Medicaid expenditures. The findings suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into MMC did not reduce Medicaid spending in the typical state. If anything, our results suggest that the shift to MMC increased Medicaid spending and that this effect was especially present for risk-based HMOs. However, the effects of the shift to MMC on Medicaid spending varied significantly across states as a function of the generosity of the state's baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates.
Introduction
The Medicaid program currently provides health insurance to more than 60 million lowincome U.S. residents. Expenditures are jointly financed by the federal and state governments, and total program expenditures were $401 billion in 2010 (CMS, 2010) . Each state administers its own Medicaid program and has some latitude with respect to eligibility rules, which services are covered, and how generously to reimburse health care providers. States also have flexibility in how they administer the benefit, with many opting to contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other managed care organizations (MCOs) to coordinate and finance care for Medicaid recipients.
The usual motivations for Medicaid managed care (MMC) contracting are to improve quality and reduce expenditures relative to the traditional fee-for-service model. The most common type of MMC plan is the HMO, which receives a fixed amount per Medicaid recipient per month to coordinate and finance all enrollee's medical care.
1 Contracting with HMOs includes the additional benefit of partially insulating the state from financial risk and thus improving budgetary predictability. The other common MMC model is primary care case management (PCCM), in which a primary care provider both monitors and approves the care received by Medicaid recipients while receiving a small management fee each month (in addition to any fee-for-service reimbursement to which they are entitled). 2 By 2009, more than 71 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in some form of managed care (KFF, 2010a) . The corresponding share in the early 1990s was just 10 percent. The increases in MMC enrollment during this period were largely driven by state and local mandates that required certain categories of Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan.
In this paper, we use data for all fifty states and the District of Columbia to investigate the effect of MMC contracting on Medicaid expenditures. Theoretically, one might expect MMC contracting to reduce program expenditures, as HMOs would have a strong financial incentive to reduce the use of unnecessary treatments, to improve the coordination of medical care, and to keep patients healthy. Even PCCM plans could lower spending if they improved medication adherence or steered enrollees to more efficient providers. On the other hand, previous work has found that the key channel through which managed care reduces spending in the private health insurance market is by negotiating lower provider prices (Cutler et al, 2000; Dor et al, 2004; Shen and Melnick, 2006 ).
Medicaid's provider reimbursement rates are generally much lower than those for commercial insurers, leaving little room to reduce expenditures through the price channel. Thus, even if insurers succeed in reducing the utilization of medical care, spending might increase if insurers cannot negotiate provider payment rates that are as low as the fee-for-service Medicaid program.
Previous work on the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures has focused on individual states, in most cases over relatively short time periods, rather than considering all states simultaneously. The results from this research provide mixed evidence, with some studies suggesting that MMC enrollment increases Medicaid spending and others finding the opposite. Of course, the results from any one state may not generalize to the nation as a whole, as each state's Medicaid program has unique features that might influence its benefits from MMC contracting. Thus it is ultimately an empirical question whether the shift of Medicaid recipients from traditional fee-forservice into managed care plans has on average reduced the strain on state budgets and also whether this effect varies across states.
To investigate this issue, we obtained data for the 1991 through 2009 time period on Medicaid enrollment, MMC enrollment, and state Medicaid spending from the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) . This data is available annually at the state level and includes detailed information about the type of spending (e.g. hospital, physician, managed care plan)
and about the type of MMC enrollment (HMO or PCCM) . During the time period that we consider, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC plans increased from 11 percent to 71 percent, as shown in Table 1 .
Our first set of empirical analyses investigates the relationship between the fraction of a state's Medicaid recipients in managed care plans and its Medicaid spending. Our specifications control for Medicaid enrollment and the demographic characteristics of Medicaid recipients. We also include state fixed effects to account for unobserved, time-invariant differences across states, year fixed effects to control for changes in Medicaid spending that are common to all states in a given year, and state-specific time trends to account for differences across states in the growth rate of Medicaid spending that are unrelated to MMC enrollment.
Our findings indicate that increases in MMC enrollment are significantly positively related with total Medicaid spending. More specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in Medicaid spending. This estimate is driven by the shift to Medicaid HMOs and other risk-based plans, as PCCM enrollment growth is not significantly related with Medicaid spending. Our estimates increase when we exclude those categories of Medicaid spending that would be largely unaffected by MMC. More specifically, when we exclude Medicaid DSH and long-term care spending, our estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment increases Medicaid spending by 1.0 percent.
One possible concern with this first set of results is that Medicaid recipients who enroll in MMC may differ in unobserved ways from those who remain in traditional fee-for-service. For example, Medicaid recipients who -opt in‖ to MMC may have higher or lower costs on average than their observably similar counterparts in fee-for-service. To address this concern, we next pursue an instrumental variables (IV) strategy in which we utilize data from the Urban Institute regarding state and local mandates that required Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO or some other form of managed care. This data set allows us to identify which counties in the U.S. had a Medicaid HMO and/or PCCM mandate in effect for each year from 1991 to 2001, and we update this data through
2003
. 3 We create our instrument by using county population to construct the share of a state's residents in a county with an MMC mandate in each year.
Our analyses exploit cross-state variation in the timing and the extent of the MMC mandates.
As shown in Figure 1, In the pages that follow, we describe the growth in MMC during the past two decades, briefly summarize the literature on MMC, describe our data and identification strategy, and use multiple approaches to estimate the effect of MMC enrollment on Medicaid spending.
The Growth in MMC Enrollment from 1991 to 2009
In 1991 and as shown in Table 1 , just 10.6 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in a managed care plan. Most (7.4 percentage points) of this enrollment was in HMOs and other prepaid health plans. These plans are typically paid a fixed amount per member per month, and are responsible for choosing a network of health care providers, negotiating reimbursement rates, and managing the care of their enrollees. The key feature of the HMO payment model is that the plan is at risk for the cost of their enrollees' medical care. If enrollees' costs turn out to be higher than anticipated, the MMC plan does not receive additional reimbursement. Because of this, HMOs and other prepaid health plans have a strong financial incentive to reduce the utilization of unnecessary or low-value treatments and to include relatively low-priced hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers in their network.
A less comprehensive form of managed care used by many states during our study period is primary care case management (PCCM). Under this model, a primary care provider is paid a fixed amount per member per month to monitor and approve care for MMC enrollees (Rawlings-Sekunda et al, 2001) . In contrast to the HMO model, under PCCM the physician is not at financial risk for the cost of their patients' care and does not negotiate rates with health care providers. However, PCCM providers may affect Medicaid expenditures through encouraging more efficient medical and pharmaceutical utilization or through improving care in other ways. In this baseline year, just 3.2 percent of Medicaid recipients were in PCCM. 
Previous Literature
A large body of previous research has investigated the effect of HMOs and other managed care organizations on the quality and cost of medical care among the privately insured. The evidence on quality of care is mixed, with one influential survey article finding an approximately equal number of studies suggesting improvements as reductions (Miller and Luft, 1997) . Studies focusing on cost have generally found that managed care lowers health care spending in the private sector.
These savings are often achieved primarily through reductions in provider prices rather than in reductions in the utilization of medical care (Cutler et al, 2000; Dor et al, 2004) . Previous evidence also suggests that managed care was more successful in reducing costs during the 1990s than in more recent years (Shen and Melnick, 2006) .
Much previous work has also explored the effect of managed care in the Medicaid program, where the growth in managed care enrollment was especially rapid during the 1990s. For a number of reasons, one might expect the effect of managed care to be different for Medicaid recipients than for the privately insured. First, Medicaid's reimbursement rates for hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers are on average much less generous than the rates negotiated by private health insurers (Gruber, 2003; Garrett and Zuckerman, 2005 A recent Robert Wood Johnson Foundation synthesis report provides a thorough overview of research on the effect of Medicaid managed care on access, quality, and expenditures (Sparer 2012 ).
Much of the literature focuses on access and quality; this is unsurprising because managed care is a substantially different delivery system than fee for service. 
The Relationship between MMC Enrollment and Medicaid Spending
The typical motivation for shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into Medicaid managed care is that it will lead to improved access and quality of care for Medicaid recipients while simultaneously allowing states to reduce Medicaid spending. While several case studies of specific states suggest the possibility of cost savings (Lewin Group, 2009) , no systematic analysis of a large sample of states has ever been conducted. The analysis in this section aims to fill this gap by using CMS data on total annual Medicaid spending in each state from 1991 through and including 2009.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth considering the relative strengths and weaknesses of using aggregate data to answer this question. Previous work on this same issue for California's Medicaid program used individual-level claims and enrollment data for a random 20 percent sample of the state's Medicaid population during the 1993 to 2001 period (Duggan, 2004) .
One advantage of this approach was that it allowed the author to use individual fixed effects for a large sample of program participants and thus estimate whether spending for the same individual increased or declined following a mandate-induced shift into MMC. 10 However, one important disadvantage was that it excluded certain categories of Medicaid spending such as administrative costs, which are not included in claims data and might plausibly change following a shift to MMC.
Similarly, this previous study ignored the possibility of general equilibrium effects -namely that shifting Medicaid recipients into MMC might affect how health care providers treated those remaining in FFS. The aggregate state data utilized in the present study includes a more comprehensive measure of Medicaid spending and would capture those general equilibrium effects.
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Turning now to our analyses of state-level Medicaid spending, our key explanatory variable is the share of Medicaid recipients in MMC plans. We also estimate several specifications in which we differentiate between HMO and PCCM enrollment. Our baseline specification is as follows:
In this equation, the dependent variable is the log of Medicaid spending. We control for the log of the number of Medicaid recipients to account for the fact that Medicaid spending will tend to be much 10 With a sample of more than one million Medicaid recipients, an additional benefit of the individual-level data was that it yielded relatively precise estimates. 11 It is also worth noting that, in order to perform an analysis similar to the California one for the entire U.S., it would be necessary to obtain Medicaid claims data for all fifty states, as CMS does not currently produce a random sample for Medicaid as they do for Medicare. This no doubt also partially explains why many issues that have been researched extensively for Medicare, such as variation across geographic areas in spending and treatment patterns, have been virtually ignored for the Medicaid program.
higher in states with high Medicaid enrollment like California than in low enrollment states like North Dakota. We also control for the age distribution of Medicaid recipients (fraction ages 0-14 and fraction age 65 and up), and for the fraction eligible because of blindness or a disability. Each specification that we estimate includes a full set of state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends to control for differences in both the level and the growth rate of spending across states that are unrelated to MMC enrollment. We also include a full set of year fixed effects to control for changes in Medicaid spending that are common to all states.
In contrast to a specification that uses per-recipient Medicaid spending as the dependent variable, this specification allows spending for the marginal recipient to differ from the average recipient. If marginal recipients tend to be less expensive than the average, then the coefficient estimate on  1 will be less than 1. As we discuss below, our results are qualitatively similar if we instead use per-recipient Medicaid spending as our dependent variable.
The explanatory variable of interest is β 1 , which captures the relationship between MMC enrollment and Medicaid spending after controlling for the variables described above. To the extent that MMC enrollment leads to lower spending, one would expect a negative estimate from this parameter. Of course, it is possible that changes in MMC enrollment are correlated with other unobserved determinants of Medicaid spending, and thus β 1 may not capture the average causal effect of MMC enrollment. To address this concern, in the next section we estimate a companion set of specifications using an instrumental variables strategy.
The first column of Table 5 summarizes the results from our baseline specification. Our point estimate for  1 is 0.057 and this is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in
Medicaid spending. This is to some extent surprising given that a primary motivation for shifting Medicaid recipients into MMC plans is often to reduce spending. Our results strongly suggest that the opposite is true. The estimate for  1 is substantially less than 1 at 0.203, suggesting that the marginal Medicaid recipient has lower spending than the average recipient. The significantly negative estimate on the share under the age of 15 is as expected given that children are on average much less expensive than other Medicaid recipients. The estimates for the coefficients on the share elderly and the share blind or disabled are both positive, as expected, but are not statistically significant.
In the next specification we split the % MMC variable into the share in PCCM plans and the share in HMOs and other risk-based plans. The significantly positive point estimate for HMO plans is almost three times as large as the insignificant estimate for PCCM plans (0.073 versus 0.025) and these two estimates are significantly different from one another at the 10 percent level (p-value of .065). It therefore appears that the increase in spending associated with the shift to MMC plans is driven by HMOs and other risk-based plans.
One potential concern with this first set of estimates is that it includes all categories of Medicaid spending. There are certain components of Medicaid spending that are very unlikely to be affected by MMC contracting, such as long-term care and Disproportionate Share hospital payments.
Thus in the next three pairs of specifications we consider alternative measures of Medicaid spending that exclude one or both of these components. In every case, the point estimate is larger than in our baseline specification. For example when we exclude both categories of spending, the point estimate for  1 on the % MMC variable increases from 0.057 to 0.101, with this latter estimate significant at the five percent level. Had the estimates instead remained the same or declined, it might suggest that we were picking up the effect of other shocks to Medicaid spending that were affecting all categories.
Instead, our results strongly suggest that the components of Medicaid spending most affected by MMC grow more rapidly than the unaffected components when MMC enrollment grows.
In the final pair of specifications, we focus on the 1991 through 2003 period given this is the same time period during which we have information on MMC mandates, which serve as our instrument in the next section. In general the point estimates are almost identical to the ones in our baseline specification though because the standard errors increase somewhat they are no longer statistically significant.
Our results are very similar if we explore the relationship of the fraction in MMC with
Medicaid spending per recipient. 12 For example if we estimate a specification in which we use this as our dependent variable (and thus no longer control for the log of the number of Medicaid recipients)
we obtain a point estimate of 373. Given average Medicaid spending per recipient of 6253 during our study period, this is equivalent to a 6.0 percent increase, which is almost exactly the same as the implied effect from the log of Medicaid spending specification.
One final concern with this first set of specifications is that it considers all Medicaid recipients simultaneously. If one looks across Medicaid eligibility categories, it is clear that children and non-elderly adults who are eligible due to low income (as opposed to because of a disability) are much more likely to enroll in managed care. 13 We therefore obtained data from an alternative source within CMS on Medicaid spending by eligibility category for the 1999 (the first year available) through 2009 period. 14 Estimating an analogous specification to the one in the first column of Table   5 , we obtain a point estimate of 0.047 for this group, which is very similar to the baseline point estimate of 0.057. More importantly, our estimate for all other Medicaid recipients is slightly negative (-0.044). This provides further support for our results above as it suggests that Medicaid 12 We also estimated specifications in which we explored the relationship of the explanatory variables described above with the change in the log of Medicaid spending. Our results with this dependent variable were qualitatively similar, suggesting that if anything the shift to MMC increased the growth rate of Medicaid spending. 13 As shown in Appendix Taken together, the results in this section strongly suggest that the shift to MMC has on average increased rather than reduced Medicaid spending. In the next section we probe further on these results by instrumenting for the share in MMC using state and local MMC mandates.
The Effect of State and Local Mandates on MMC Enrollment
The OLS results described in the previous section suggest that Medicaid managed care (Brown et al, 2011) . To the extent that the individuals who voluntarily enroll in MMC differ from their observably similar counterparts who remain in fee-for-service, a plausibly exogenous source of variation in MMC enrollment can be used to estimate its effect on spending or other outcome variables of interest. (Duggan, 2004) .
B. State and Local MMC Mandates
The current study extends this approach by using data on MMC mandates and Medicaid spending for all fifty states during the period when MMC enrollment experienced most of its growth.
The last two columns of Table 1 As shown in (Bertrand et al, 2004) . In each specification,   is substantial and precisely estimated, ranging from 0.465 in the most parsimonious specification to 0.374 in the least.
C. The Effect of MMC Mandates on MMC Enrollment
The final three specifications break the primary explanatory variable into its three components: the share of the state population residing in a county with a PCCM mandate, mixed mandate, or HMO mandate. The results listed in column (4) show that each of these three mandate types were strongly predictive of overall MMC enrollment, with precisely estimated coefficients ranging from 0.329 for the share residing in a PCCM mandate county to 0.418 for the share residing in a mandatory HMO county. Columns (5)- (6) demonstrate the relationship between these explanatory variables and enrollment in PCCM and HMO plans. Not surprisingly, the share residing in a mandatory PCCM county has a strong predictive relationship with PCCM enrollment, and no relationship with HMO enrollment (coefficients are 0.373 and -0.044, respectively). The converse is true for the share of a state population residing in a mandatory HMO county (coefficients of -0.040 for the PCCM specification and 0.458 for the HMO specification). There is a substantial and precisely estimated coefficient on the share residing in a mixed mandatory county in both columns, suggesting that mixed mandatory policies are relevant for both PCCM and HMO enrollment.
Comparing the coefficient in column (5) of 0.263 to the coefficient in column (6) if 0.149 suggests that residing in a mixed mandatory county is more strongly related to PCCM enrollment than HMO enrollment. This comparison is unsurprising because Medicaid recipients in these counties are often auto-enrolled in a PCCM plan if they do not choose their own plan.
Taken together, the results in this section demonstrate that the MMC mandates implemented by state and local governments during our study period led to significant increases in MMC enrollment. From 1991 to 2003, the fraction of Medicaid recipients with a mandate in their county increased from 5.9 percent to 77.9 percent. Multiplying the increase in this share by our estimate of the average effect of the mandates on MMC enrollment in the third specification (0.374), we estimate that the mandates induced a 26.9 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment. This represents more than half of the actual increase of 47.8 percentage points during our study period.
The Effect of Mandate-Induced MMC Enrollment on Medicaid Expenditures
As shown in Table 3 , the shift from fee-for-service to managed care within the Medicaid program during our study period was associated with a significant shift in the composition of We begin our IV expenditure analyses by estimating the effect of mandate-induced MMC enrollment on the share of Medicaid spending paid to MMC organizations versus directly to health care providers. This sheds some light on the extent to which MMC could plausibly have affected total Medicaid spending. To do this, we use the mandate variables described above as instrumental variables for the share of a state's Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC. The specifications summarized in columns (3), (4), and (6) of Table 6 represent our -first-stage‖ in the IV specifications below.
The key assumption of this empirical approach is that, after controlling for state fixed effects, (2), year effects control for common proportional changes in Medicaid enrollment, while statespecific linear trends allow for a constant growth rate in enrollment. For the same reasons in our analyses of total Medicaid spending, we take the log of this variable.
policymakers responded to Medicaid enrollment increases by shifting more of their recipients into managed care plans.
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We next investigate whether the mandates are driven by past increases in Medicaid expenditures by estimating specifications of the following type:
(4) Mandate kt =  t +  k +   * Log(Medicaid Spending k,t-1 ) + t *  k +  kt
To the extent that state policymakers respond to increases in their Medicaid spending by shifting more of their recipients into managed care plans in the future, one would expect to obtain a positive estimate for   . However, we once again obtain a small and statistically insignificant estimate (of .028 with a p-value of 0.862), suggesting that the mandates are not being driven by accelerations in state Medicaid spending.
Another potential concern is that state policymakers shifted Medicaid recipients into MMC plans in response to past, current, or expected changes in economic conditions. To explore this possibility, we also estimated specifications similar to (3) and (4), in which we replaced the independent variable with one of three state-level unemployment variables: lagged, contemporaneous, and next year's unemployment rate. In all three cases, the coefficient was statistically insignificant, and the t-statistic never exceeded 0.50. These results suggest that mandate implementation was not correlated with the business cycle. Further threats to validity may of course still exist. For example, other changes in Medicaid programs that could affect Medicaid expenditures may not be orthogonal to mandate implementation. For example, states may cut eligibility criteria (or reduce outreach) while simultaneously shifting recipients to MMC plans. Likewise, Medicaid recipients may migrate between mandate and non-mandate counties in response to mandate implementation. These changes would likely change the composition of Medicaid recipients. Our controls for the age and eligibility categories of Medicaid recipients in our expenditure specifications should go some way toward addressing this concern. Table 7 summarizes the results from specifications that investigate the effect of the mandateinduced increases in MMC enrollment on the composition of Medicaid spending. This table provides evidence that the switch to managed care caused a shift from providers to managed care plans, validating the mandate and MMC enrollment variables. The first column summarizes the results from this specification, in which the outcome variable is the share of a state's Medicaid spending being paid to hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers:
A. The Effect of Mandate-Induced MMC Enrollment on the Composition of Medicaid Spending
We instrument for MMC kt using the fraction with a mandate (see the first stage specification 3 from Table 6 ). To the extent that MMC mandates cause a shift in Medicaid spending from health care providers to managed care plans, one would expect a negative estimate for . 21 Given that (1) MMC enrollees tend to have lower costs on average than their counterparts who remain in fee-for-service and (2) more than one-fourth of MMC enrollment is in primary care case management, one would expect the magnitude of this estimate to be substantially less than one. Consistent with this, the statistically significant estimate for   displayed in column (1) is -0.125. The second column includes the share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in an HMO as an additional explanatory variable because, unlike PCCMs, HMOs typically coordinate and finance most of the medical care for their enrollees.
As might be expected, there is a strong negative relationship (  equal to -0.382) between the share 21 To the extent that shifting from FFS to MMC increased overall spending, one would see a slightly larger increase in the capitation share than if overall spending was unchanged. Suppose, for example, that a 10 dollar reduction in FFS spending (caused by a shift to MMC) was associated with a 15 dollar increase in capitation spending. In that case, the capitation share would increase somewhat more than if total spending was unchanged.
of payments going directly to health care providers and Medicaid HMO enrollment. There is no corresponding relationship for PCCM enrollment, which is consistent with the predictions above.
The next two columns of Table 6 This is plausible given that the elderly and disabled, for whom per-recipient Medicaid spending is several times more expensive, typically remained in FFS.
Appendix Table 2 further demonstrations the negative relationship between provider payments and enrollment in managed care-in particular, enrollment in HMOs. Most notably, the negative relationship is strongest for hospital and physician payments. The relationship is weaker for prescription drugs, which is unsurprising because many managed care programs carve out prescription drugs to take advantage of statutory Medicaid pharmaceutical rebates. There is no relationship for long-term care providers, likely both because long term care is often carved out of managed care programs and because the aged and disabled are less likely to be enrolled in managed care. Thus, these specifications serve as a useful -falsification test‖ for our identification strategy.
Taken together, the results in this subsection reveal that the policy-induced shift of Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into Medicaid managed care has resulted in a shift of program expenditures from providers to insurers. Of course, many of these same providers ultimately receive the payments disbursed to health insurers. Interestingly, this shift in the composition of Medicaid spending is only present for Medicaid HMOs. Furthermore, and as expected, revenues for certain categories of providers, such as long-term care facilities, have been relatively unaffected by Medicaid managed care. The next subsection explores whether the mandate-induced shift from fee-for-service to MMC has affected total Medicaid spending.
B. The Effect of Mandate-Induced MMC Enrollment on Total Medicaid Spending
To investigate the effect of the mandate-induced increases in MMC enrollment on Medicaid spending, we begin by estimating specifications of the following type:
In this regression, the outcome variable is the log of Medicaid spending in state k and in year t. We control for the same explanatory variables described above 22 and also for the log of the number of Medicaid recipients. State fixed effects control for time invariant differences across states in the level of Medicaid spending, while state-specific linear time trends control for differences across states in the average growth rate of Medicaid spending. adherence to pharmaceutical protocols and steering them to certain providers, despite not being at financial risk. However, it is important to emphasize that these estimated effects are only suggestive as neither coefficient is statistically significant.
The IV results are largely consistent with the OLS specifications from Table 5 , particularly those that cover the same time period. These results provide little evidence that MMC reduced state spending on Medicaid, and they provide suggestive evidence that Medicaid HMOs increased
Medicaid spending by more than PCCM plans. See Schwartz et al (1991) for a detailed description of this data. Our specifications assume that the index captures the relative generosity of reimbursement for all health care providers, though it uses just newborn deliveries to estimate this. However, research by Duggan (2000) suggests that newborns account for the majority of all Medicaidinsured hospital discharges, and this would likely be especially true for the MMC population. It is also worth noting that neither Arizona nor Wyoming were included in this survey. Also, this data is for just one year and is not updated over time. While national analyses of Medicaid reimbursement generosity have been conducted since this study appeared, virtually no studies aim to measure this on a state-by-state basis relative to commercial insurance. We therefore use this relatively old data, which was constructed just prior to the start of our study period.
C. Differential Effects by Relative Provider Reimbursement Rates
Medicaid was not more generous than commercial health insurance in any state around the beginning of our study period.
The results displayed in the fifth column of However, our findings do suggest that in states with relatively generous Medicaid reimbursement, 27 Our primary source for this ratio is Norton and Zuckerman (2002) and these ratios are for 1998. However, the data are missing for several states in this survey, and thus we supplement it with data from Zuckerman et al (2009) Medicaid demographic information on age and eligibility through blindness or disability status also came from the MSIS data reports. In the early-1990s, these reports were filled out & entered into CMS systems by hand, and in a two cases there were clear instances of data entry being swapped between columns. These instances are the following:
-Arkansas: age 85+ and age unknown were swapped for 1991 and 1992 -Connecticut: Eligibility through Blind/Disabled, Adults in FDC, and Title XIX were swapped in 1991
Mandatory Managed Care Enrollment Policies
The Urban Institute conducted surveys in 1998 and 2001 to determine what types of MMC policies existed for the welfare population in different geographic areas and years. Their surveys differentiated between primary care case management programs and comprehensive managed care organization programs and between voluntary and mandatory programs of both types. Survey data was cross-checked with other sources, such as the CMS MMC enrollment reports and case studies where possible. The resulting data set reports the existence of these managed care policies using binary variables for each county-year observation. The 1998 survey is described further in Garrett, et al 2003, which uses survey data from 1991-1995 in conjunction with National Health Interview Survey data from the same time period to study the effect of MMC mandates on access and utilization.
State-level mandate variables were constructed by combining these indicator variables with countylevel population data. For example, if a state had two counties -one with 70 people and a mandatory managed care policy, and the other with 30 people and no managed care policy -the state-level variable, percent mandatory, would equal 70 percent because 70 percent of the state's population lives in a county with a mandatory managed care policy.
In order to capture additional years of data beyond the MMC expansions in the 1990s, 
